RECENT CASES.
ADVERSE POSSESSION..
A tax deed void because it shows that several lots in a town
were sold at one sale and that the county purchased them as a
competitive bidder is void on its face and not adTa Deed:
Color of Title missible in evidence to show color of title to support adverse possession under a statute of limitations. Supreme
Court of Oklahoma in Kellar v. Hawk, 91 Pacific Reporter,778.
This case follows the rule expressed by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Redfigid v. Parks, 132 U. S. 239.
Several jurisdictions hold that a tax deed though void on its
face may show color of title. See Pharis v. Bayless, 122 Mo.
.24, and Wilson v. Atkinson, 77 Cal. 485.
There is also confusion as to what is necessary to make a
deed void on its face.
It has been held that an instrument must be so obviously defective that no man of ordinary capacity would be misled by
it. See Anent v. Arrington, io5 N. C. 390.
CARRIERS.
The plaintiff brought action for damages against Georgia
Railroad & Electric Co., for an insult by the conductor of said
company, alleged to have been committed by the latter in compelling the plaintiff, a white man, to sit in a portion of a car
Duty of
reserved, by a police ordinance,, for negroes, thus
Caoers:
publicly intimating that he was a negro, or of
Protection
African descent. Wolfe v. Georgia R. R. & ElecFrom Insult
tric Co., 58 S. E. Rep. 899 (Court of Appeals of Georgia-Oct.
3, i9o7). Two points are considered by the Court: (i) Is the
defendant street car company liable for insulting conduct on
the part of its servants, and (2) is it an actionable ingult to
call a white man a negro? A street railroad is answerable in
damages. for the insulting conduct of one of its drivers toward
a passenger. Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. R., 57 Mo. 202. Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 178 N. Y. 347. "The present
decision accords with the trend of cases which hold the care of
carriers in respect to passengers one of peculiar responsibility
and delicacy. Their contract with him is not for mere room
and personal existence-L-but for respectful treatment and that
decency of demeanor whicli constitutes the charm of social life;
and that acts need not amount to an assault and battery before
the law takes sognizance." Chanberlainv. Chandler, 3 Mason
(U. S.) 242.
(62)
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The second point affords more difficulty. Is it actionable to
call a white man a negro? The distinction of the social status
of the different classes of citizens has been quite generally
recogni7ed throughout our legislation. This difference of races
adverted to is recognized almost universally by the laws
against inter-marriage. Ex Parte Hobbs, x Wood, 537; by
the laws for the separation of passengers by common carriers,
Plessy v. Fcrguson, 163 U. S. 544; and in the separation of the
school children, Cisco v. The School Board, i61 N. Y. 598.
These decisions are based upon the intrinsic differences between
the two races, not on the ground of inferiority or inequality.
The Court in the case in hand rests its decision, that it is an
actionable insult to call a white man a negro, upon the same
basis.
Plaintiff held a ticket from stations A to B; when the conductor took up her ticket he agreed, at her request, to stop the
train at an intermediate point and assist her to
liroad Co. alight. The train stopped at the agreed point, but
for Acts 'o
the conductor failed to assist the plaintiff. There
Conductors
was no platform, plaintiff fell and was injured.
ield, these facts did not show negligence on thepartof the railroad company.
Appellate Court of Indiana, in Sellers v. Cleveland, etc., Ry.
Co., 8i N. E. Reporter, io87.
This cases decides that it is outside the scope of a conductor's
employment to make agreements with passengers to let them
off at points not on the train schedule.
If injury had been caused to a person other than the party
with whom the agreement was made, it would seem the company would be liable; Quin v. Powers, 87 N. Y. 54o.
That a conductor is authorized to make contracts with passe'ngers to let them off at points not on the train schedule was
held in R. R. v. McCurdy, 45 Ga. 28K, and R. R. v. Young, 51
Ga. 489.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The Legislature of Alabama passed a statute providing that
the instituting of a suit by a foreign corporation, in a Federal
"ghtof sta. Court, "shall ipso facto forfeit all its right or
to
exel a
license to engage in or carry on said business,
Frotion:
originating
and terminating in this State, of freight
Reasonablene s of
or
and its right
or license
to engage
in
R.14 Rates
or passengers,
carry such business,
in this
State, shall
by said
Act be revoked, or shall cease."

Other statutes were passed
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).
making two and one-half cents per mile, the maximum
rate for intra-state passengers, fixing the maximum intrastate- freight rates on certain articles, and providing
that the rate in force January I, 1907, should be the maximum
intra-state rate on articles other than those mentioned. Held,
that the statute first mentioned above is contrary to the Constitution of Alabama, which gives the right to all corporations to
sue in all courts. That, while a State may arbitrarily expel a
foreign corporation, yet if it solicits that corporation to come
into the State, to do certain acts and enter into contracts suggested by itself, and those acts have resulted in contracts, vesting in the corporation title to property and the right to use it,
the State will be taken to have waived its right to expel without
cause. A statute passed expelling such a corporation, deprives
the corporation of its property without due process of law, impairs the obligation of contracts entered into at the solicitation
of the State, is a breach of an implied legislative contract existing between the corporation and the State and is a refusal to
give equal protection of the laws to both foreign and domestic
corporations. Further, the Court found that sufficient had been
shown by the complainant railroad, to overcome the burden
on its part of showing'the rate unreasonable. Seaboard Air
Line v. RailroadCommissioners, 155 Fed. 792. See Perkins v.
Railroad, 155 Fed. 445.

CORPORATIONS.
A trust deed was executed, making A trustee to receive any
dividends of certain stocks, whether in money or scrip of any
description, and pay over the same to the tenant
Dividends:
scripfor life, with remainder to B or his heirs. DiviIncome .. d
dend obligations were issued. In a contest between
pinecipal:
the tenant for life and remainderman held, these
Life Tenant:
Remainderobligations must be regarded as part of the income
man
and therefore become the property of the tenant
for life. (Robinson's Trust, 218 Pa. 481.)
This decision is in line with Pennsylvania rulings. The leading case on this question is Earp's App. (28 Pa. 368), which,
however, did not go to the extent of the principal case. In
Earp's Appeal the enhanced value of the stock and accumulated profits prior to the testator's death was considered as
belonging to the principal, and only such stock, issued from
profits amassed subsequently, was regarded as income. In
the principal case no distinction appears to be made in this respect. Both cases are contra to the English view. Hoopes v.
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Rossiter. i McClel. 527; in re Barton Trust, L. R. 5 Eq., 238.
Massachusetts courts, in following the English rule, have held
that dividends of stock (to which dividend obligations are
essentially similar, except for the lack of voting power), accrue
to the remainderman. Minot v. Paine,99 Mass. ioi; Balch v.
Hullett, io Gray, 4o8. While in New Jersey (Van Doren v.
Olden, i9 N. J. L. ii7), and in New York (Clarkson v. Clarkson, 18 Barb. 646; Simpson v. Moore, 18 Barb. 638; Lowry v.
Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 172 N. Y. 137), the cases seem
to adhere to the doctrine of the present case. However, in
both the last mentioned jurisdictions, masters are appointed to
determine the quantum of stock issued from increased value,
from the income or earnings, and whether from earnings previous or since the investment.

A creditor of a corporation being himself a stockholder
therein, instituted proceedings against some only of
the stockholders to enforce payment of their uns ptions paid balances. It was objected that all must be
found as defendants. Held, the plaintiff need not join all the
stockholders as defendants, and the whole claim will be apportioned among those before the Court, the plaintiff paying his
own pro rata share. Blood v. La Serena Land & C." Co., 89
Pac. iopo (Cal.) i9o7. See note appearing elsewhere in this
issue.
ULnbity Un=e stock

CRIMINAL LAW.
'Witness was attacked at night from behind; she did not see
her assailant, but he spoke a few short sentences. She became
insensible without having seen him. Several days
Evldene:
Ideincatou later a number of suspects were made to speak
by Voi Alone within the hearing, but not the sight of the wixtess.
She identified the accused by his voice. He was a complete
stranger. Held, this evidence admissible not as mere matter of
opinion, but as direct and positive proof of a fact and its probative value is a question for the jury. The Supreme Court
of Florida in Mack v. State, 44 Southern Reporter, 706.
The rest of the evidence on which the accused was convicted was purely circumstantial. The decision is supported
by Commonwealth v. Williams, io5 Mass. 62, and Commonwealth v. Hayes, 138 Mass. 185, though in both these cases the
witness had heard the accused speak at least once prior to
commission of the crime.
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EVIDENCE.
Two questions are raised in the case of State v. Baruth, 9!
Pacific, 977 (Supreme Court of Washington, Oct. io, 1907),
as to the admissibility of statements against defendant made
by the deceased-(i) while the defendant was
Statements
present and hearing, and (2) while the defendant,
CAling for
accompanied by a third party, was in an adjoincenaof
ing room, the door between being closed, but heard
DefrlldUt
what the deceased spoke-in fact commented to the third person on the statements being made by the deceased in the adjoining room. The Court held that the statements made while
the defendant was in the presence of the deceased, under such
circumstances as she would be reasonably expected to reply
thereto, were admissible; but that all statements made by the
deceased after the defendant went into the adjoining room with
the third party were inadmissible even though she heard the
further accusations, understood and commented on them.
While the general practice is to admit such evidence only
where the accusations are made under such circumstances that
the defendant would be reasonably expected to reply, yet this
decision goes to the extreme in holding the evidence inadmissible under the facts of the case. The fact that the defendant
listened to the statements of the deceased and commented thereon to the third person in her presence, thus showing that she
both heard, understood and believed that the third person
heard, should overcome the contrary presumption created by the
physical barrier between the accuser and the defendant. Clearly
the abuse of discretion by the lower Court in admitting such
staterfients was not such as to give grounds for reversal of
judgment by the appellate court.

GIFTS.
B gave his wife, the defendant, the contract of sale to T, of
a certain plot of ground, together with the deed, directing her
c~upa norts: to place the same in escrow in her name, until the
Delfvery

payment of the purchase money by T. The defend-

ant did as directed. It was held that as between the defendant
and her step-son this constituted a valid donatio causa mortis.
(Davie v. Dazie, 91 [Wash.] 950.) The points raised by
the contestants of the gift were among others: (i) the insufficiency of the delivery; (2) the futility of an attempt to convey
a gift of land orally. The second ground of contention was met
by the rule of law, which, in a contract for the sale of real
estate, operates as a conversion of the same, by changing the
title of property in the vendor to a personal right to the pro-
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ceeds of the sale (King v. Ruchering. 21 N. J. Eq. 599; Bender
v. Luckenback. 162 Pa. i8).
The disposal of the question of delivery was perhaps less
aptly or satisfactorily accomplished. In Phinny v. State, 36
Wash. 236, a case upon which the Court placed gredt stress,
the chief reason for the decision was that inasmuch as the
rights of a creditor were not at stake, the doctrine of constructive delivery should be given wide license and latitude. The
Court in the principal case saw, therefore, in the handing over
of the contract of sale and the deed, a constructive delivery,
considering it preposterous to require the delivery of that which
was not then in existence and could not, therefore, be physically
transmitted. In Waite v. Grubbs, 43 Ore. 236, an oral gift of
money buried at various places on a farm was held a good
donatio causa inortis. The case under dicsussion, while in line
with this, seems to carry the doctrine of constructive delivery
to its ultimate bounds and beyond, Pennington v. Gittings (2
Gill & Johnson [Md.] 208).
Quaere: might not the principal case be upheld on the ground
that the delivery of the written evidence of a chose in action
will constitute a valid donatio causa mortis, regarding the contract of sale as such evidence?

INSURANCE
The question arose as to whether A, the deceased, could, after
designating his wife as the sole beneficiary of a policy upon his
Life insrasnce: life, with no provision as to substitution or alteraBeneic;,rytion after the death of the beneficiary' change the
Sa
On 0' same for the benefit of his daughter, the plaintiff.
vesi"d
It was held that immediately upon the issuance of
InutresU
the policy the beneficiary interest vested in the
wife, and could not be divested by A without her consent or
that of her representatives after her decease. (Smith v. Ins.
Co,. 34 Super. Pa. 72.)
This decision is in accord with the doctrine on this question.
The instant a policy is issued the interest of the beneficiary becomes vested; Glanz v. Gloeckler, 104 Ill. 573; Gould v. Emerson, 99 Mass. 154; Scott v. Dickson, io8 Pa. 6.
Hani v. German Life Insurance Co., 197 Pa. 276, coincides
directly with the principal case.
The second portion of the decision has been followed generally; Washington Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S. Rep. 195;
Anderson's Est. 85 Pa. 202.
One of the theories upon which an opposite conclusion has
been reached is. that. this is a chose in action, which, like all
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choses of the wife not reduced to possession during the joint
lives of the husband and wife, passes to the former if he survive, and upon the death of the wife may be disposed of by
him; Olmsted v. Key, 85 N. Y. 593. Another theory is that
since the whole object in procuring the policy and paying the
premiums was to protect the wife, upon her death the object
ceasing, he could dispose of the beneficiary interest by will or
otherwise; Kernan v. Howard, 23 Wis. io8. The last mentioned decisions have not, under statutes, been followed in their
respective jurisdictions, 95 N. Y. Supplement, 780; Canterbyv.
Ins. Co., io2 N. W. io96.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
A city issued bonds under legislative authority for the purpose of establishing a public electric lighting system. The
funds thus procured were insufficient, however, to
of
D sral
extend the system throughout the city's territorial
srpl,, Eleoc
limits, but to the extent that the system was in
ttc Power
operation the plant was adequate and there was surplus power.
The city proposed to dispose of the surplus power to private
parties for compensation, and to use current funds of the city
to effectuate this purpose. A private company having previously received from the city a franchise to install a lighting
plant and supply individuals with light and power, sought to
restrain the city from thus disposing of its surplus electricity.
Held, the city might so dispose of its surplus power. See note
appearing elsewhere in this issue.

NEGLIGENCF.
A child eight and one-half years of age was run down by a
trolley car at a crossing, the evidence tending to show that the
Contributory car was negligently operated. The child had
='V3.d= ,Q crossed the track, and being frightened, turned
hack when the car was less than fifty feet away
Ten
and was injured in attempting to recross the track.
Held, that the question of contributory negligence on the
part of the child was for the jury, and that the trial Judge
properly refused to non-suit the plaintiff.
The degree of care required of such a child is to be determined by her maturity and capacity; Smith v. North Jersey
St. Ry. Co., 67 Atl. Rep. 753.- The same rule prevails else-
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where; Railroad Co. v. Stout; 84 U. S. 657; Birge v. Gardiner,
19 Conn. 5o7. In other jurisdictions the degree of care required is that exercised by ordinarily careful children of the
same age under like circumstances; Munn v. Reed, 86 Mass.
431; Strudgeon v. Village of Sand Beach, io7 Mich. 496. The
plaintiff is required to prove affirmatively that the child was
in the exercise of due care; Hayes v. Norcross, z62 Mass. 546.
In cases where the degree of contributory negligence was
no greater than in the case under discussion, the question was
not allowed to go to the jury; Hayes v. Norcross, supra; Miles
v. Railroad Co., 4 Hughes (Fed.) 172.
A declaration averred that the defendant negligently put diseased ham into a can and sold the same to a reWh=o*I.to tailer; that the plaintiff purchased the same and
Consumer
was made sick by eating the ham. Demurrer. Held,
the demurrer was sustained on the ground that there is no implied warranty of wholesomeness by a manufacturer in the
sale of food to a retail dealer; Tomlinson v. Armour, 65 At.
Rep. 833 (N. J.). See note appearing elsewhere in this issue.

SALES.
Plaintiff, after failure on part of his prospective vendee to
complete a contract of sale for certain cars, leased iii writing
the cars, to the said prospective vendee, with right
Balrt or
Conditional
of purchase. These cars came into the hands of the
eP~rol
defendant, claiming through the original lessee.
Testimony
Held, that the instruction of the Court below that
the writing created a bailment and not a sale, gubmitting to
them at the same time, the question whether the written agreement contained the real contract of the parties, or the transaction was really a sale, was correct; American Car Co. v.
R. R., 218 Pa. 5i9. The first part of the instruction was in
line with the established principle that a lease with a right to
purchase, passes no title to the property, but merely gives the
right to purchase at the expiration of the lease; Powell v.
Eckels, 96 Mich. 538. The instrument being unquestioned and
unambiguous in itself, could not be varied by parol testimony;
Andrews v. Main, 92; Ill. 40. As the testimony admitted was
not to vary the written instrument, but to show whether the
instrument represented the real agreement between the parties,
the conclusion reached by the Court seems correct.
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WILLS.
A testator devised his property to trustees to establish and
maintain a Spiritualist church and library. He was a SpiritualTtamentary ist of a pronounced type, believing in many im¢caity:
possible occurrences; e. g., that his mother, long
Belief In.
spiritualism
since dead, was in the habit of coming to his room
as Eildene

and kissing him good-night, and that his son, who

died in infancy, had grown to manhood in spirit land and had
recently appeared before the testator and patted him on the
cheek, etc. The belief was in accordance with the articles of
faith of the Illinois Spiritualist Association, and the testator
specifically denied in his will that he was influenced by "spirits,"
although strong evidence to the contrary was srown at the trial.
Held, that there was not a scintilla of evidence of insane delusion which might have rendered the deceased incapable of testamentary capacity, nor of any undue influence, and that the
question ought not to have been submitted to a jury; Owen v.
Crumnbaugh, 81 N. E. Rep. (Ill.), io44.
That a mere belief in spiritualism does not, ipso facto, constitute an insane delusion, rendering the believer wanting in testamentary capacity, is well established; in re Spencer, 96 Cal.
448; Brown v. Ward, 53 Md. 376. The present case, however,
is, it is believed, an extension of the doctrine which cannot be
supported on principle or by authority. The conclusion on the'
facts is inconsistent with the tests laid down in the decision
itself. See paragraphs i and 2, page lo51. An exactly opposite
conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of Indiana only
a month earlier; Steinkuehler v. Went pner, 81 N. E. Rep. 482,
and the same result was independently reached in Michigan a
month later; O'Dell v. Goff, 112 N. W. 736. The reasoning of
the courts of Indiana and Michigan is supported by the weight
of authority; Robinson v. Adams, 62 Maine, 369; Thompson v.
Hawkes, 14 Fed. 9o2.
On principle, it is submitted, no reason can be assigned for
taking from the consideration of the jury evidence of delusions
(in the mind of a testator), which cannot be accounted for on
any rational basis, merely because such delusions are in harmony with, or even constitute, a certain religious belief. For an extreme view, contrary to this case, see Lyon v.
Home, L. R. (z868) 6 Eq. 653, 692.

